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Why, contrary to their predecessors, did the Taliban resort to use of suicide
attacks in the 2000s in Afghanistan? By drawing from terrorist innovation literature and
Michael Horowitz’s adoption capacity theory—a theory of diffusion of military
innovation—the author argues that suicide attacks in Afghanistan is better understood as
an innovation or emulation of a new technique to retaliate in asymmetric warfare when
insurgents face arms embargo, military pressure, and have direct links to external terrorist
groups. The findings of my in-depth case study of Afghanistan between 1978 and 2010
support the proposition and show that it was an arms embargo, coupled with what I call
military pressure, and a direct link to an external terrorist network that made the Taliban
resort to the use of suicide attack in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
How could this evil have come to us? … We never had these things before. Not even when
the Soviets occupied our lands. What are these killers trying to achieve?
an Afghan elder, Ghazni - Afghanistan, 2007.1
Fighting a U.S. armored vehicle or aircraft with an AK-47 is not much different from
putting on an explosive vest. Either way you'll be killed.
Mullah Sabir, a senior Taliban commander,
2007.2
It's not easy being in the Taliban. It's like wearing a jacket of fire. You have to leave your
family and live with the knowledge that you can be killed at any time.
Bari Khan, a Taliban commander, 2009.3

For the last three and a half decades, Afghanistan has been experiencing both externally
led (1979-89 & 2001-present) and internally fueled civil wars (1978-1979 &1989-2001).
However, what has been interesting but thus far largely ignored is the different tactics
used by Afghans in responding to these wars. From the late 1970s to early 1990s, Afghans
heavily relied on guerilla warfare tactics in their fight against the Soviets and their puppet
regime in Afghanistan. Once the Afghan Mujahidin took over the central government in
1992, the ensuing civil war witnessed conventional military tactics among warring Jihadi
parities. However, after 9/11 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime by a US-led
international coalition, suicide attack – a previously unknown tactic – has become a
common phenomenon in Afghanistan. Taliban are increasingly using suicide attack as a
tool in their fight against the US, NATO and Afghan forces. But why now?
Afghans did not resort to use of suicide attacks4 in their national uprising against

1

Williams, Brian Glyn, 2008, “Mullah Omar's Missiles: A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in
Afghanistan,” (Middle East Policy. Vol. 15, No. 4: pp. 26-46), p. 27.
2
Yousafzai, Sami and Ron Moreau. 2007. “Suicide Offensive.” Newsweek. Vol. 149, Issue 16: pp. 34-36.
3
Yousafzai, Sami and Ron Moreau. 2009. “The Taliban in their Own Words.” Newsweek. Vol. 154, Issue
14: pp. 34-44.
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the Soviet invasion and its puppet regime that cost them an estimated 1.24 million lives,5
4.2 million wounded and maimed,6 and another 5 million refugees,7 even though the
strategy was quite successful in places like Lebanon and Sri Lanka in the 1980s.8
Similarly, while suicide attacks were becoming a relatively popular tactic throughout the
Middle East, and parts of South Asia in the 1990s,9 there was no use of suicide bombings
among various Afghan factions struggling for political dominance and control between
1992 and 2001.10 Therefore, the question we need to ask is why, contrary to their
predecessors, did the Taliban resort to use of suicide attacks in the 2000s in Afghanistan?
Despite a large literature on suicide bombing and terrorism more generally,
existing theories11 do not provide a convincing explanation to this question. Meanwhile,
to the best of my knowledge, the only three pieces that directly or indirectly deal with
suicide attacks in Afghanistan—UNAMA Report (2007),12 Brain Glyn Williams (2008)
fieldwork,13 and Seth Jones (2009) book14— are neither systematic nor rigorous.

4

“The Afghan Mujahidin rebels never resorted to suicide bombings against the Soviets in the 1980s...”
Source: Williams, Brian Glyn, 2011, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America's Longest War, (PENN:
University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 202.
5
According to Asia Watch an estimated 1.24 million dead, and five million refugees (Asia Watch 1991, 9)
6
Hilali, A. 2005. US-Pakistan relationship: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publishing Co.
7
According to Asia Watch an estimated 1.24 million dead, and five million refugees (Asia Watch 1991, 9)
8
See Pape’s (2005) Dying to Win p.22 for success of suicide bombing campaigns.
9
See Pape’s (2005) Dying to Win p.22; and Richardson’s (2006) What Terrorist Want p. 113 for spread of
suicide attacks.
10
“The Afghan Mujahidin rebels never resorted to suicide bombings against the Soviets in the 1980s, nor
did the Taliban in the 1990s.” Source: Williams, Brian Glyn, 2011, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to
America's Longest War, (PENN: University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 202.
The really first suicide attacks in the history of Afghanistan happened two days prior to 9/11 when two Arab
terrorists assassinated the legendary leader of Afghan guerrilla warfare and anti-Taliban resistance, Ahmad
Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001. Source: Coll, Steve. 2004. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of CIA,
Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10 2001. New York: Penguin Press.
11
Pape’s occupation theory (2005, Dying to Wing); Bloom’s outbidding thoery (2005, Dying to Kill);
Moghadam’s diffusion of Al-Qaeda’s Jihadi ideology (2008, The Globalization of Martyrdom)
12
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Report. 2007. “Suicide Attacks in
Afghanistan (2001-2007).” Available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%202007SuicideAttacks.pdf
13
Williams, Brian Glyn. 2008. “Mullah Omar's Missiles: A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in
Afghanistan.” Middle East Policy. Vol. 15, No. 4: pp. 26-46.
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While the UNAMA report highlights individual level factors influencing suicide
bombers, it doesn’t say why the Taliban, as an organization, resorted to the use of suicide
attacks. On the other hand, while Williams’s fieldwork provides a detailed and valuable
insight about diffusion of suicide attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan, he does not consider
other factors and explanations. And finally, Seth Jones’s assertion on the Taliban’s
reliance on Al-Qaeda, effectiveness of the tactic, and media attention as a motivational
factor, fail to address what made suicide attacks attractive in the first place.
Therefore, with the aim of providing an explanation for the Taliban’s resort to the
use of suicide attacks in the 2000s, this paper is the first systematic assessment of suicide
attacks in Afghanistan, and a country-specific contribution to existing literature on suicide
bombings. It should be noted that this paper is not about the resurgence of the Taliban and
increased insurgency in Afghanistan, but rather an attempt to explain what made the
Taliban resort and heavily rely on suicide attacks in their retaliatory campaign since the
fall of their regime in December 2001.
In so doing, the author argues that arms embargo, coupled with what I call military
pressure, and direct links to an external terrorist network made the Taliban resort to the
use of suicide attacks. I would like to point out that what I propose here is not a
groundbreaking or a general theory of suicide attacks, rather it is an integration of
diffusion and innovation literature to provide a new framework for explaining suicide
attacks in Afghanistan.
My dependent variable is suicide attacks in Afghanistan, which is defined in this
paper as an act of using one’s body as a weapon to kill or destroy the enemy or the target
14

Jones, Seth G. 2009. “In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan.” New York: W.W.
Norton & Company.
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(e.g., human, building, vehicle).15 Although scholars agree on the content and meaning of
suicide attack, specifically the death of the perpetrator as a condition, they vary on
labeling the term. There are at least four terms—‘suicide terrorism,’ ‘suicide mission,’
‘suicide bombing,’ ‘suicide attack’—used to refer to the same phenomena of killing the
enemy by using one’s body as a weapon. Due to controversy surrounding the terms
suicide terrorism16 and suicide mission,17 I refrain from using them and instead use
suicide attack18 and suicide bombing19 interchangeably. 20
My independent variables—arms embargo, military pressure, and diffusion—are
derived from explicit assertion or implicit assumption of terrorist innovation literature21
and Michael Horowitz’s (2010) adoption capacity theory, a system level theory of
15

This definition is drawn from and is in line with those offered by Pape (2005, p. 10), Bloom (2005, p. 76),
Pedahzur (2005, pp. 8-12), and Moghadam (2008, p. 6).
16
Here I am on board with Assaf Moghadam (2008), who refutes the use of ‘suicide terrorism.’
Moghadam (2008) argues that the term is problematic because “no agreed upon definition of suicide
terrorism is possible as long as the word terrorism itself is subject to various different interpretations” (p. 5).
Furthermore, by accepting the term suicide terrorism based on a commonly cited definition of terrorism, an
“attack … aimed at noncombatants” (p. 5), we will intentionally exclude all those incidents of suicide
bombings that were directed towards “uniformed men and women on active duty” (p. 5).
17
Here, I am in line with Rober Pape (2005) and Michael Horowitz (2008), for refraining from the use of
‘suicide mission.’ Pape (2005) argues that “suicide missions are hard to identify reliably since we rarely
know for certain that an attacker who did not kill himself or herself actually expected to die” (p. 11). Along
the same line, Horowitz (2008) notes that “the means of destruction in this case [suicide mission], the way
they perpetrate the attack, is the machinegun they fire, the grenade they throw, or the bomb they drop. They
know they are probably going to die, but it is not their deaths that cause the mission to succeed. They are
simply going to die accomplishing their mission. That is very different than a suicide attack where it is
through your death that your mission, the killing of others or destruction of a target, is accomplished. The
mission is accomplished through your death.” Source: Horowitz, Michael. 2008. “The History and Future of
Suicide Terrorism.” Essay based on presentation at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Available at
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.horowitz.suicideterrorism.html
18
Horowitz, Michael. 2008. “The History and Future of Suicide Terrorism.” Essay based on presentation at
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Available at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.horowitz.suicide
terrorism.html
19
Bloom, Mia M., 2005, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, (New York: Columbia University
Press), p. 76.
20
These terms are widely used by Robert Pape (2005, p. 10), Mia Bloom (2005, p. 76), Ami Pedahzur
(2005, pp. 8-12), and Assaf Moghadam (2008, p. 6).
21
Rasmussen, Maria J. and Mohammed M. Hafez. 2010.“Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect:
Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators.” Workshop Report. Defense Threat Reduction Agency US Department of Defense. Available at http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/2010%200
19%20Terrorist%20Innovations%20in%20WME.pdf
Hafez, Mohammed M. and Maria Rasmussen. 2012.“Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect,
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diffusion of military innovation.22
The first independent variable, arms embargo, is inferred from terrorist innovation
literature’s emphasis on battlefield obstacle.23 Arms embargo imposed against insurgent
groups present a challenge that insurgents would try to overcome by looking for
alternative weaponry and tactics. Arms embargo, for the purpose of this paper, is defined
as the prevention of “direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer… of arms and related
materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition … [and] paramilitary equipment”
to the insurgent groups.24 To operationalize arms embargo, I will look at the presence or
absence UN imposed arms embargoes against the various Afghan insurgent groups along
with the presence or absence of third party nation-states supplying weaponry to the
Mujahidin and/or the Taliban throughout the period under analysis (1978 - 2010).
My second independent variable, military pressure, is inferred from Horowitz
(2010) and terrorist innovation literature’s assumptions that “asymmetrical military
disadvantages”25 and ensuing “constraints in the security environment”26 present a grave
challenge to the insurgents, which should drive them to innovate and find ‘equalizers.’27 I
refer to this power disparity that exerts force on the insurgents and limits their operational
freedom as military pressure. I will define military pressure as governments’ exercise of
force through their security forces with a clearly stated objective of killing or capturing

Phase II.” Workshop Report. Naval Post Graduate School – Center on Contemporary Conflict. Available at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=142894
22
Horowitz, Michael C. 2010. The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International
Politics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
23
Hafez and Rasmussen, 2012, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, p. 4; Rasmussen and
Hafez, 2010, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, p. 9.
24
UN.org. “ARMS EMBARGO: EXPLANATION OF TERMS.” Available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/EOT%20Arms%20embargo_ENGLISH.pdf
25
Horowitz, Michael C, 2010, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 179.
26
Hafez and Rasmussen, 2012, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, p. 4.
27
Horowitz, Michael C, 2010, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 179.
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and targeting insurgents’ infrastructure to eliminate insurgency.
To operationalize military pressure, I will look at number of factors such as
number of troops, military operations, killing the enemy, and holding the ground that are
meant to eliminate the enemy, but are dependent on data availability. However, I would
like to mention that data for operationalizing these factors is severely restricted to
military operations conducted between 2002 and 2007, and the number of military
personnel deployed between 2002 and 2009. Similarly it is impossible to find systematic
data on the number of insurgents killed each year. This means that any reference to
military pressure in the 1980s and 1990s is less systematic and more descriptive in
nature, but nonetheless provides a picture of military pressure prior to 2002.
And finally, diffusion, my third independent variable, is derived from Horowitz’s
proposition about diffusion of military innovation and the importance of external links to
the non-state actors. Horowitz describes diffusion as “the process by which (1) an
innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the
members of a social system.”28 I will use diffusion and link to external groups
interchangeably throughout this paper. For operationalizing diffusion, I will look at the
presence or absence of a direct link between the Afghan insurgent groups and external
terrorist groups or militant organizations.
My method of analysis is qualitative case study, because neither the nature of this
study nor the available data was suitable for any type of quantitative analysis. Indeed, one
of the most difficult aspects of research on suicide bombings is the dearth of data. The
findings of my in-depth case study support the proposition and show that it was an arms

28

Horowitz, Michael C, 2010, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 19.
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embargo, coupled with what I call military pressure, and direct links to an external
terrorist network that made the Taliban resort to the use of suicide attacks.
The paper is organized in the following manner. First, I go through the current body
of suicide bombing literature to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. The next section
is the theory and method. Here I present Michael Horowitz’s adoption capacity theory
along with terrorist innovation literature to provide theoretical background for hypothesis.
This will be followed by a brief overview of methodology. Section four presents the
empirical findings and analysis. The last section concludes the paper.

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Suicidal attacks are centuries old phenomena and weapons of choice that human beings
have used across times, cultures, and religions for particular purposes. In the earliest
instances of suicide attacks, the perpetrators (e.g., Jewish Zealots - 4 BC-70 AD;
Ismaillis-Nazari - 1090-1256) used conventional military tools of the time (e.g., swords,
firearms) to kill the target(s) without caring for their own safety and lives.29 Due to the
intention of the perpetrators, scholars regard those early instances as suicide attacks.30
There is a whole body of descriptive literature that deals with the historical manifestations
of suicide attacks.31
29

Bloom, Mia M. 2005. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia
University Press; Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New
York: Random House.; Moghadam, Assaf. 2008. The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad,
and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimor: the Johns Hopkins University Press; Hassan, Riaz. 2011.
Suicide Bombings. Routledge.
30
Bloom, Mia M. 2005. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia
University Press; Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New
York: Random House.; Moghadam, Assaf. 2008. The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad,
and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimor: the Johns Hopkins University Press; Hassan, Riaz. 2011.
Suicide Bombings. Routledge.
31
Moghadam, 2008, The Globalization of Martyrdom; Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill; Pape, 2005, Dying to
Win; Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings; Dale, Stephen Fredrick. 1988. “Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia:
Anticolonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Philippines.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 32, No
1: pp. 37-59; Richardson, Louise. 2006. What Terrorist Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the
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Modern day (post-1980) suicide attacks, in general, and the events of 9/11 in
particular, have led scholars to vigorously study and hypothesize the root causes of this
phenomena. Some scholars have looked at isolated individual or societal level factors
such as psychopathology, religion, or poverty; whereas, recent scholarly findings
emphasize at broader approach, integrating individual and societal with organizational
level factors.32 Thus, I will explore suicide attack literature and its main theories around
the framework of “three levels of analysis.”33
A. Individual Level Theories
Individual level explanations “have attempted to explain this phenomenon as the result of
brainwashing, extreme poverty, emotional dysfunction, or feelings of despair.”34
One of the early theories of suicide bombing at the individual level attributed it to
psychological factors. Some scholars argue that psychological factors such as
powerlessness, humiliation, and hopelessness combined with sense of power that comes
from deciding about ones own and others lives and deaths, make individuals carry out
suicide bombing.35 Furthermore, according to Riaz Hassan (2011), psychological theorists
Threat. New York: Random House; Reuter, Christoph. 2004. My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of
Suicide Bombing. Princeton University Press; Dzikansky, Mordecai, Gil Kleiman, and Robert Slater. 2012.
Terrorists Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press;
Winkates, J. 2006. “Suicide terrorism: martyrdom for organizational objectives.” Journal of Third World
Studies. Vol. 23, No.1: pp.87-110.
32
Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings; Hassan, Riaz. 2010. Life as a Weapon: The Global Rise of Suicide
Bombings. Routledge; Hassan, Riaz. 2009. “What Motivates the Suicide Bombers? Study of a
comprehensive database gives a surprising answer.” Available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/whatmotivates-suicide-bombers-0; Gill, Paul. 2007. “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing.”
International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV). Vol. 1, No. 2: pp. 142–159; Hafez, Mohammed M.
2006b. “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical
Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol. 29, Issue 2: pp. 165-185;
Moghadam, Assaf. 2005. “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach.” Working draft
Presented in Harrington Workshop on the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism. University of Texas at Austin.
Available at http://tamilnation.co/terrorism/sri_lanka/moghadam.pdf.
33
Hafez, 2006b, “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers,” p. 165.
34
Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill. p. 1.
35
Speckhard, Anne. 2008. “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.
Vol. 31, Issue 11: pp. 1023–1051; Speckhard, Anne and Khapta Akhmedova. 2008. “Black Widows and
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label terrorists as “mad and bad men and women … [who] suffer from various forms of
mental deficiency and personal disorder.”36 Meanwhile, such individuals are
demographically characterized as “uneducated, unemployed, socially isolated, single men
in their late teens and early twenties.”37
However, these studies have failed in producing tangible results38 and “cannot
explain why suicide terrorism occurs only in certain societies and at certain point [and]
why over 95 percent of all suicide terrorist attacks occur in organized campaign that are
concentrated in time.”39 Meanwhile, there is an inconsistency between “demographic
profile” of “suicidal individuals” and suicide bombers. Contrary to psychological
theorists’ demographic framing of suicide bombers, Pape (2005) found that suicide
bombers’ “lifestyle” greatly vary, meaning “they have been college educated and
uneducated, married and single, men and women, isolated and socially integrated; they
have ranged in age from fifteen to fifty-two.”40
Poverty is deemed as another potential factor affecting both individual and broader
society in harboring terrorism. It had a strong appeal among academia and echoed among
policy circles, which is evident from the speech of George W. Bush, then President of the
United States: “We fight poverty because hope is the answer to terror. … We will
challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that
too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize.”41 However, a growing body of

beyond: Understanding the motivations and life trajectories of Chechen female terrorists.” In Female
Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization, edited by Cindy D. Ness. New York:
Routledge. Pp. 100–121.
36
Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings. p. 36.
37
Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 17.
38
Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings.
39
Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 17.
40
Ibid., p. 17.
41
As qtd. in Scott Atran, 2003, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” para. 18. Available at
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literature questions the argument linking suicide bombings to poverty at the individual
level.42
But some still argue that its ‘indirect effects’ in broader socio-political context
cannot be disregarded.43 Economically poor countries with weak state apparatus not only
provide fertile operational ground for terrorist organizations and networks, but also enable
these groups to exploit citizens’ perceived notion of relative deprivation in recruiting
them.44 This argument, however, is also refuted with quantitative empirical findings.
Robert Pape (2005) illustrates that “the countries plagued by suicide terrorism from 1980
to 2001 are by no means the worst off in the world … [and meanwhile,] the most
economically hopeless states in the world … [did not experience] a single suicide terrorist
attack during this period.”45
Meanwhile some argue that “Suicide attackers do not usually claim to act out of
despair, or for personal, fatalistic reasons. Instead, they usually claim to act as martyrs for
altruistic reasons—that is, for the sake of their larger community, their country, or
religion.”46 This postulation is referred to as altruistic reasons for suicide bombing. For
Barbara Victor (2003), the main factors influencing individuals’ participation in suicide

http://www.sciencemag.org/content/299/5612/1534.full#ref-21
42
Haddad, S. 2004. “A comparative study of Lebanese and Palestine perceptions of suicide bombing: the
role of militant Islam and socioeconomic status.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology. Vol. 45:
pp. 337-363; Berrebi, Claude. 2007. “Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism
among Palestinians.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. Vol. 13, Issue 1, Art. 2; Krueger,
Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. 2004. "Education, Poverty And Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?"
Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 17, Issue. 4: pp. 119-144; Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova.
2002. “The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers.” New Republic Issue 24: pp. 27-34; Bergen,
Peter and Swati Pandey. 2006. “The Madrasa Scapegoat,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 29, Issue 2: pp.
117–125.
43
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Report. 2007. “Suicide
Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007).” Available at http://www.securitycouncil report.org/atf/cf/%7B65
BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%202007SuicideAttacks.pdf
44
Moghadam, 2005, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach.”
45
Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 18.
46
Moghadam, 2008, The Globalization of Martyrdom, p. 8.
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bombings are personal vengeance and retaliation to losses in the family or close
associates, and peer pressure. Meanwhile others argue that altruistic reasons such as
feeling of responsibility towards member of the community compel individuals to conduct
suicide attacks.47 Adding to that Ami Pedahzur (2005) argues that sense of responsibility
and dedication to an even greater cause, especially an ideological one, motivates some of
the suicide bombers to sacrifice themselves.
To sum up, factors that influence individuals to participate in suicide bombings are
complex and beyond dying to inflict damage; rather these factors have:
… a broader significance for achieving multiple purposes – from personal to communal.
These include gaining community approval and political success; liberating the homeland;
achieving personal redemption or honor; using martyrdom to effect the survival of the
community; refusing to accept subjugation; seeking revenge for personal and collective
humiliation; conveying religious or nationalistic convictions; expressing guilt, shame,
material and religious rewards; escaping from intolerable everyday degradations of life
under occupation, boredom, anxiety and defiance.48

As Mia Bloom (2005) points out, “the individual bombers might be inspired by several—
sometimes complementary—motives,”49 however this paper is particularly interested in
understanding what makes organizations, in our case the Taliban, to resort to the use of
suicide attacks. Therefore, with an eye on individual level factors, this paper mainly
concentrates on organizational causes and motives. However, prior to evaluating
organizational theories of suicide attack, I would like to go through the societal level
explanations of suicide attacks.
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B. Societal Level Theories
It has been claimed that the broader environment (e.g., culture, history, religion,
politics…) lays out the rules and norms for acceptable and unacceptable deeds, and at
times, provides pathways for conducting such notorious acts that were previously
regarded as unacceptable.50
Some scholars perceive religion, especially Islam, as the main factor influencing
suicide bombers.51 Sam Harris (2004) argues that there is ample undisputed evidence that
Islamic doctrine, the Quran, encourages terrorism, and as such, rather than being
manipulated, the religion of Islam is the source of violence.52 However, a growing body of
scholarly findings refute such notions,53 arguing that religion is neither “necessary” nor
“sufficient cause” for suicide bombings.54 Pape (2005) argues that “Religion is rarely the
root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist organizations in recruiting and in
other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective.”55 Along the same line, Bloom
(2005) asserts that “even the most religious organization that employs suicide terror is
pragmatic and power seeking. Their political survival is ultimately more important than
any ideology.”56
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Meanwhile, historical antecedents of suicide attacks (e.g., Jewish Zealots,57
Japanese kamikaze58) and its modern manifestations (e.g., Sri Lankan Hindu Tamil
Tigers59 and secular Vietnamese Viet Cong units60) demonstrate that Muslims were not
the sole perpetrators of suicide attack. According to Assaf Moghadam (2008), the Muslim
groups initially had difficulty justifying suicide attacks because Islam does not allow
suicide (my emphasis).61 Overall, the evidence suggests that religion (e.g., Islam) is not
the cause or reason behind suicide attacks, but rather used as a tool by the insurgent
organizations in pursuit of their objectives.
Besides religion, domestic support for suicide campaign is perceived to be a
crucial societal factor in sustaining the campaign. Local support tends to be high in places
where suicide bombing is perceived as “a legitimate military tactic” against specific
targets (e.g., security forces, political elites) or in cases where “the hatred for others is
very high.”62 Otherwise, if used indiscriminately against civilian population, the tactic
“will fail to win over the hearts and minds of the public … [and] will only deepen the gap
between the insurgents and the masses.”63
Adversaries’ harsh counter-terror tactics and strategies are major factors in
influencing domestic support for suicide attacks. According to Mohammad Hafez
(2006b), prior to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (second Palestinian uprising, Sept
2000 - Feb 2005), two-thirds of Palestinians were against indiscriminate suicide bombings
– specifically targeting Israeli civilians. However, “Israel’s heavy handed tactics, of
57

Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 11.
Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill, p. 14; Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 13.
59
Moghadam, 2008, The Gloablization of Martyrdom, p. 22.
60
Ibid., pp. 15-16
61
Ibid., pp. 17, 21-22.
62
Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill, p. 81.
63
Ibid., p. 81.
58

14
targeted assassination, preemptive attacks to root out the terrorists, and destruction of their
infrastructure” dramatically altered Palestinians’ perception about the use of suicide
attacks against Israeli population.64 As a result public support for indiscriminate use of
suicide bombings increased from one-third-approval rating of the Oslo peace years (19932000) to two-thirds during Intifada, only to reach its peak (74.5%) in October 2003.65
With the increase of approval ratings among the Palestinian population for suicide attacks,
the number of suicide attacks increased from 28 attacks of the Oslo peace era (1993-2000)
to “110 suicide attacks” in the subsequent three years of post-Oslo peace, which means
the average suicide attacks per year increased from 4 to 36.66
Meanwhile, use of advanced military capabilities (aerial power) against insurgent
groups often causes civilian casualties, which increases the propensity of domestic
support for the insurgent groups and increases the pool of their recruitment for suicide
attacks.
The evidence presented above shows that domestic support is crucial for sustaining
suicide attacks, but it is not the initial cause of suicide attacks. Although Hafez (2006a)
claims that some militant organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in 1994, and AlAqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 2000, adopted
suicide bombings due to extreme pressure from society suffering under occupation, the
triggering effects were something else. In the case of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, “the
Israeli decision to deport 415 Palestinian militants to Lebanon in 1992 had disastrous
unintended consequences as the Palestinians learned the value of the tactic from
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Hezbollah.”67 Whereas, the latter groups – Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine – adopted suicide attacks due to competition among various
rebel organizations for popularity and local support.68 Therefore, rather than extreme
societal pressure, diffusion and intergroup rivalry were the reasons behind the Palestinians
groups resort to the use of suicide attacks.
One might ask that given the Taliban’s low level of domestic support (less than
10%),69 how did the Taliban manage to sustain their suicide attack campaign. There are
two explanations for this trend. The first one, although contested, is the availability of
foreigners ready to blow themselves up for the cause of the Taliban.70 The second
explanation is the presence of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan71 along with Pakistani
madrasas (religious school) that provide fertile ground for the Taliban’s recruitment.72
Meanwhile, causalities caused by the use of coalition aerial bombings and drone strikes
also increases the pool of the Taliban’s recruits. According to Pakistani Television
Network’s chief news correspondent, Mushtaz Mihans, “whenever a village or houses are
bombed in tribal areas, it creates more suicide bombers. It’s not just because they have
been lured by a cleric with a promise of heaven, it’s also because of the Pashtun badal
tradition [which means revenge at any cost].”73
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After assessing the individual level theories and societal level postulations, which
were unable to provide convincing explanations for Taliban’s resort to the use of suicide
attacks, the paper turns to organizational theories of suicide attacks for possible
explanations.
C. Organization Level Theories
Scholars studying suicide attacks at the organizational level highlight that organizations
employ suicide bombing due to its materialistic dimension and incentives.74 According to
these scholars, suicide bombing is an effective strategy for organizations fighting a
technologically advanced and superior adversary for various reasons. First, it inflicts
comparably more physical and material damage than any other sort of assault. Second,
with such great efficacy, suicide bombing requires minimal resources in terms of
equipment, training and manpower.75 Third, it not only affects perception and sentiment
of democratic citizens towards the war, which is crucial for changing the attitude of their
political representatives to withdraw their troops, but also delegitimizes the local
governments by creating instability and sense of chaos among ordinary citizens.76
However, adopting suicide bombing is not an easy task for organizations. Prior to
endorsing suicide bombings, organizations go through cost-benefit analysis and evaluate
opportunities and risks associated with such strategy. Pedahzur (2005) argues that
organizations willing to endorse suicide bombing go through three stages prior to making
any final decision. In the first stage, decision makers rationally calculate the choice of
pursuing suicide bombing with the probable consequences of losing domestic support.
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Next comes the issue of recruiting ideologically motivated individuals. The third and final
stage involves training and mentally preparing the suicide bombers. This involves
isolating individuals from the rest of the community, and the process is continued until
they are totally brainwashed.77
These scholars, however, differ on their account of what motivates insurgent
groups to resort to the use of suicide attacks. For Moghadam (2008), the spread and
dramatic increase of recent suicide attacks are indebted to Al-Qaeda’s “Salafi-Jihadist
ideology.”78 Meanwhile, rather than blaming “religious fanaticism,” Pape (2005) regards
nationalism and home land liberation as a driving force behind individuals’ and
organizations’ motivation to use suicide attacks in their fights against occupying forces.
And finally, Bloom (2005) argues that competition among various rebel organizations for
dominance and local support, make these groups to endorse suicide bombing. These
postulations have led to three main organizational theories of suicide bombing.
1. Counter-Occupation Strategy

One of the prominent theories of suicide attacks blames occupation for endorsement and
rise of suicide attacks.79 Orchestrated by Robert Pape (2005), the theory counters
conventional wisdom that linked suicide attacks to Islam, poverty or psychopathological
factors, and instead regards suicide bombing as a strategic tool used by groups pursuing
nationalistic goals and objectives. His empirical analysis of more than three hundred
incidents of suicide attacks over a period of more than two decades (1980 - 2003) supports
his theoretical postulation that a “secular and strategic goal” such as nationalism and
emancipation of homeland from foreign invaders or occupiers, is the driving force behind
77
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suicide bombings.80 As such, suicide bombing is used as a “strategy of coercion” to make
the occupier, mainly democratic countries, rethink their policy of occupation.81
However, according to Moghadam (2008), there are some flaws in Pape’s theory
of nationalism and emancipation of homeland from invaders. First of all, the rising
number of suicide attacks occur in countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia,
Morocco, UK, US, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Uzbekistan that are not under any
“discernible occupation.”82 Second, Moghadam argues that most of the attacks in Iraq are
not directed towards the occupiers, who should be the target according Pape; rather the
victims are various Iraqi ethnicities. Third, he notes that even in the case of attacks against
foreign invaders in Iraq, the perpetrators are foreign nationals (Saudis, Kuwaitis, Syrians
and other North African Jihadis) rather than Iraqis, who according to Pape’s theory should
conduct such acts because they are victims of occupation. Meanwhile, according to
Michael Horowitz (2008):
… while occupation can explain some cases of suicide bombing, it cannot explain nonadoption by prominent groups… Consider the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)
in Northern Ireland, a violent terrorist group whose members had no problem dying for
the cause but which never adopted suicide terrorism (on a few occasions they kidnapped
families and forced the husband to drive a bomb loaded with explosives towards a
83
checkpoint, but those are coercive rather than voluntary).

The counter-arguments show that although an important contribution, Pape’s occupation
theory does not explain most cases of suicide attacks. Occupation is definitely not the
reason behind post-9/11 suicide attacks in Afghanistan for two main reasons: first,
Afghans perception of foreign troops presence; and second, their hatred for the Taliban.
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Rather than viewing the US and NATO-led coalition troops as invaders, Afghans warmheartedly welcome and want international forces to remain in Afghanistan until the
Afghan forces can provide Afghans with security. A UNDP and Afghan Interior
Ministry’s survey shows that two-thirds (68%) of Afghans support the presence of foreign
troops in Afghanistan.84
Meanwhile, other surveys conducted over the past years (2005-2010) show people’s
support for the current government and distaste for the Taliban.85 In response to a survey
question, “Who Would You Rather Have Ruling Afghanistan Today,” asked repeatedly
over the years (2005-2010), a majority of the Afghans (80 to 90%) preferred the current
government to the Taliban (less than 10% support).86
2. ‘Outbidding’ Theory

Another organizational theory of suicide bombing is Mia Bloom’s (2005) ‘outbidding’
hypothesis. While not totally disregarding the impact of occupation, Bloom argues that
competition among various rebel organizations for dominance and local support,
especially, when other tactics fail in enhancing the groups’ prestige and reputation, make
the militant organizations to endorse suicide bombing. Therefore, rather than religious
ideology, ‘pragmatic and power seeking’ attitudes along with ‘political survival’ are the
reason behind militant groups resort to the use of suicide attacks.87
Bloom’s theory is also not immune from shortcomings and criticisms. Horowitz
(2008) notes that the main problem of ‘outbidding’ theory is that “it does not explain
suicide campaigns where there are not elite competitions for control. For example, in the
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Tamil case, the struggle for influence among Tamil resistance groups was over before the
Tamil Tigers’ suicide terror campaign began.”88
Similarly in Afghanistan, competition for domestic support and dominance among
various Mujahidin groups in the 1980s and 1990s did not result in the use of suicide
attack. On the other hand, lack of competition among current insurgent groups (the
Taliban, Haqani network, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, Al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan) that are fighting the U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces, resulted in the use of
suicide attacks. Furthermore, Moghadam (2008) argues that the theory is incompatible
with the nature and goals of transnational groups such as Al-Qaeda that are vying for
transnational rather than domestic support. All these hint that while ‘outbidding’ theory
can explain certain cases (Palestinian factions), it fails to provide explanation for other
ones, especially, the Taliban.
3. Diffusion of Al-Qaeda’s ‘Salafi-Jihadist Ideology’

Contrary to Pape’s occupation and Bloom’s outbidding theories, Assaf Moghadam (2008)
blames Al-Qaeda’s “Salafi-Jihadist ideology” for the rise and spread of suicide attacks
among militant organizations.89 According to Moghadam, three factors contributed to the
expansion of Al Qaeda’s operations. The first was “the core doctrine of Al Qaeda” which
is based on assumption that the group would act “as a vanguard of a new global Islamic
insurgency devoted to the defense of the umma [Muslim community] wherever its wellbeing would be imperiled … [and] fight and defeat infidel and apostate countries the
world over.”90 The second reason was the return of Arab fighters to their respective
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countries after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which diffused Al-Qaeda mentality.
And finally, the strategic shift in the organizations’ modus operandi after 1995; rather
than fighting their Arab puppet regimes, Al Qaeda decided to target the west, especially
the United States.91
However, there are some problems in Moghadam’s overwhelming emphasis on AlQaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist ideology in promoting and prompting the global rise of
suicide attacks. “The idea of suicide terrorism traveled from Iran to Lebanon, but from
Lebanon it spread a long way... the skill set was transferred from Shiite (Iran and
Hezbollah) to Sunni (Hamas and later al-Qaeda) Muslims, as well as to secular Palestinian
and [non-Muslim, secular Hindu,] Tamil Groups.”92 Thus, rather than Sunni Al-Qaeda,
the Shiite Muslims, Iranians and Hezbollah of Lebanon, were the pioneering forces in
justifying and promoting the use of suicide attacks among Muslims. Furthermore, Hamas
was the first Muslim Sunni group that adopted the use of suicide attacks from Shiite
Hezbollah and as such provided a legitimate foundation for future Sunni Muslims groups,
including Al-Qaeda
Similarly, Moghadam’s method of blending and labeling some groups as SalafiJihadist or overwhelmingly influenced by them is problematic. Contrary to his portrayal
of the Taliban as Salafi-minded, they are followers of the Hanafi Deobandy School, which
is different from Salafism – a distinction that even Moghadam acknowledges.93 The
Taliban follows an established and well-defined school (Hanafi Deobandy School),
whereas Salafis (to which Al-Qaeda adhere) do not constrain themselves with any of the
four Sunni jurisprudence schools of thought (Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafie, Maliki). Rather they
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have the freedom to follow any one of them in a given matter based on authenticity of
their sources, which in some cases make manipulation of religious texts easier.
Furthermore and most importantly, while Al-Qaeda has a global aim and
intention— defending the Muslim Umma, waging global Jihad, installing the Caliphate;94
the Taliban’s objective are clearly domestic—regaining power in Afghanistan, and that is
all.95 The Taliban and Al-Qaeda were and are allies, but that is different from sharing the
same worldview.96 Therefore, to say that the Taliban were mainly influenced by AlQaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology, and branding them as Salafi Jihadist is counterintuitive.
The evidence presented above suggests that Pape, Bloom, and Moghadam’s
theories of occupation, outbidding, and diffusion Al-Qaeda’s Jihadi ideology
(respectively) fail to provide sufficient explanation for the Taliban’s resort to the use of
suicide attack. Therefore, the paper turns to Horowitz’s diffusion of military innovation or
adoption-capacity theory and terrorist innovation literature for a testable hypothesis.

III.

THEORY & METHOD

Michael Horowitz’s (2010) adaption-capacity theory is an attempt to explain the
variation in the diffusion of military innovation and the emulation of new techniques and
technologies. The main puzzle he tries to resolve is why do certain military innovations
diffuse throughout the system, while others (innovations) don’t? To this end, he
postulates that “the diffusion of military power is mostly governed by two factors: the
level of financial intensity required to adopt a military innovation, and the amount of
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organizational capital required to adopt an innovation.”97 This means military
innovations with a high financial intensity and organizational capital are less likely to
diffuse, whereas, those with low financial intensity and organizational capital are more
likely to diffuse and be adopted.
Horowitz (2010) argues that his theory can also explain non-state actors’
behavior, specifically the adoption of suicide bombings. According to Horowitz (2010),
while “the financial intensity of a suicide terror campaign is quite low… $150,” it
requires a high level of organizational capital.98 “Given the high levels of organizational
capital and low levels of financial intensity required to adopt suicide bombing, adoption
capacity predicts that groups lacking a high level of organizational capital will be
unlikely to adopt.”99 This means “more bureaucratized groups … with older
organizational ages” that have developed “particular tactics” are unlikely to adopt
suicide bombing.100
Meanwhile, in the case of non-state actors, linkages to external terrorist groups
are crucial in facilitating the process of diffusion or adoption of suicide attacks.101
According to Horowitz, a direct link to external terrorist network or groups provides the
opportunity to “coordinate and train together,” which makes it faster and easier to
transfer the knowledge about new tactics.102 Therefore, “where there are direct links
between terrorist groups, knowledge and suicide tactic should diffuse faster.”103 I
therefore argue that diffusion through links to external terrorist groups is a key factor in
97
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explaining suicide attacks.
While Horowitz is right about the importance of organizational capital and links
to external terrorist groups for emulating suicide attacks, it is equally important to
remember that militant groups do not emulate or innovate for the sake of new tactics
only or just because they are flexible; rather they do so to overcome an obstacle.104 It has
been argued that “terrorist innovation is usually motivated by problem solving intended
to overcome constraints in the security environment…”105 Innovation, at the non-state
actor level, is defined “as the adoption of a tactic or technology that the given
organization has not used or considered using in the past.”106 Thus, “problem solving
rather than advantage-seeking drives the process to learn, adapt, and invent,” specially,
when the terrorists are unable “to meet their objectives with extant methods.”107
But what are some of the ‘constraints in the security environment’ that might
cause insurgents to innovate or emulate a new tactic. Lack of “access to the full range of
hardware and equipment sought by guerrillas” are pointed out as crucial factor.108 It has
been argued that “in campaigns against capable counterinsurgent forces, it may be
difficult for insurgents to acquire weapons … Security services may monitor borders
and local markets and closely scrutinize local military forces to avoid illicit weapons
diversions.”109 If the adversary is a very powerful country, it can also prevent insurgents
from buying “weapons on international markets.”110
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Based on this line of reasoning, arms embargo imposed by a strong adversary or
the international community against insurgent groups should present a challenge and
make insurgents to look for alternative tactics or homegrown weaponry “to overcome
constraints in the security environment.”111 The main reason for the gravity of arms
embargo imposed by a strong adversary (e.g., U.S.) or the international community
against insurgent groups is that they are better able to monitor the arms embargo.
Furthermore, fear of retaliation by a strong adversary (e.g., U.S.) or the international
community is more likely to deter third party nation-states from supplying effective
weaponry to the insurgent groups. Therefore, militant organizations finding themselves
in such circumstance should be more likely to look for alternative solutions.
Meanwhile, both Horowitz and terrorist innovation literature assume
“asymmetrical military disadvantages”112 and the ensuing “constraints in the security
environment”113 to be a crucial factor in driving insurgents to innovate and find
‘equalizers.’114 I refer to this power disparity that exerts force on the insurgents and
limits their operational freedom as military pressure. I define military pressure as
governments’ exercise of force through their security forces with a clearly stated
objective of killing or capturing and targeting insurgents’ infrastructure to eliminate
insurgency.
Based on the above theoretical background, this paper argues that suicide attack
is better understood as an innovation or emulation of a new technique to retaliate in
asymmetric warfare, especially when insurgents face arms embargo, military pressure,
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and have direct links to external terrorist groups. Thus, I hypothesize:
H1: The existence of an arms embargo, the greater the military pressure, and/or
the more direct the links to external terrorist groups, the more likely insurgents
will resort to the use of suicide attacks.
To test this hypothesis, I will be doing a case study using qualitative and quantitative data
and systematically analyze these data drawn from variety of sources: books, articles,
interviews, anecdotal accounts, newspapers, speech notes, reports, and surveys. However,
it should be noted that when it comes to issues like insurgency or particular insurgent
groups, and countries like Afghanistan, it is almost impossible to find systematic data
even using various sources. Because of the lack of systematic data, there are some time
periods that there are no data, and other times where there are data available.
That being said, there are three independent variables in my hypothesis:
arms embargo, military pressure, and diffusion. However, prior to elaborating more
about their definition and operationalization, I would like to reiterate that my dependent
variable is suicide attacks in Afghanistan, which is defined in this paper as an act of
using one’s body as a weapon to kill or destroy the enemy or the target (e.g., human,
building, vehicle).115 The more than three decades of Afghan conflict is a good
representative of both non-suicide and suicide attacks campaigns, starting in 1978 to
2010.116 To operationalize my dependent variable, I will be looking at the number of
suicide attacks carried out in Afghanistan each year between 1978 and 2010.
My first independent variable, arms embargo, is inferred from terrorist innovation
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literature’s emphasis on ‘constraints in security environment.’117 As already defined in the
introduction of this paper, arms embargo means prevention of “direct or indirect supply,
sale or transfer… of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and
ammunition … [and] paramilitary equipment” to the insurgent groups.118 Due to nature of
insurgency and secrecy surrounding their activities, it is impossible to attain systematic
data for the operationalizing the impact of arms embargo over the years.
One way to overcome this challenge is to look at the presence or absence of UN
Security Council resolutions imposing arms embargo against the various Afghan
insurgent groups and their affiliates between 1978 and 2010, and similarly whether or not
the different insurgent groups (e.g., Mujahidin and Taliban) had third party nation-states
explicitly arming them throughout the period under analysis (1978- 2010). Thus to
operationalize arms embargo, I will look at the presence or absence of UN imposed arms
embargoes along with the presence or absence of third party nation-states supplying
weaponry to the Mujahidin and/or the Taliban between 1978 and 2010.
Military pressure, my second independent variable, is inferred from Horowitz
(2010) and terrorist innovation literature’s assumptions that “asymmetrical military
disadvantages”119 and ensuing “constraints in the security environment”120 present a
grave challenge to the insurgents, which should drive them to innovate and find
‘equalizers.’121 I define what I call military pressure as governments’ exercise of force
through their security forces with a clearly stated objective of killing or capturing and
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targeting insurgents’ infrastructure to eliminate insurgency.
To operationalize military pressure, I will look at a number of factors such as
number of troops, military operations, enemy casualties, and holding the ground that are
dependent on data availability. The increase in the number troops over the years means
an increase in military pressure on the insurgents. The longer the military operations and
the more troops involved in them should translate into increasing military pressure. The
more the insurgents are killed, the more they are under military pressure. And finally,
the more the military expands and holds the ground, the more pressure they exert on the
insurgents by denying them safe havens.
However, there are certain limitations with data for operationalizing military
pressure. First the data are restricted to military operations conducted by the Afghan and
foreign troops between 2002 and 2007, and number of the Afghan and foreign troops
deployed between 2002 and 2009. This means my analysis of military pressure is
restricted to the aforementioned time periods, whereas, reference to military pressure in
the 1980s and 1990s is less systematic and more descriptive in nature, but nonetheless
provides a picture of military pressure prior to 2002.
Second, due to sensitivity surrounding military campaigns and the officials’
reluctance to release detailed data on all aspects of military operations, the number of
troops that participated in each military operation and the duration of some of the
military operations conducted between 2002 and 2007 are unknown. Meanwhile, it is
hard to find systematic data on the numbers of insurgents killed each year. Finally, due
the same reason of secrecy surrounding military operations, the number of military
operations conducted each year presented in this paper (2002-2007) might vary from the
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actual number. Still I have tried to be as accurate and inclusive as possible by making
sure to at least have two sources, such as two different news media outlets, a media
outlet with a congressional report or any other two combinations of different sources, for
each of the military operations listed in this paper. Thus, due to data limitations, while it
might be possible to see elements of military pressure emanating from some factors at
one point, it might not be evident to see the same factors at other points.
Finally, diffusion, my third independent variable, is derived from Horowitz’s
proposition about diffusion of military innovation and the importance of external links to
the non-state actors. As explained earlier, Horowitz describes diffusion as “the process by
which (1) an innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4)
among the members of a social system.”122 For operationalizing diffusion, I will look at
the presence or absence of a direct link between Afghan insurgent organizations and
external terrorist groups or militant organizations throughout the period under analysis.
Again, due to data limitations, there are periods with no systematic data on diffusion
variable. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables.
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Figure 1.

Causes of Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan

As depicted in Figure 1, there are three independent variables – arms embargo, military
pressure, and diffusion – that are causing suicide attacks. Individually, these variables
might exert some influence on the occurrence of suicide attacks, however, I argue that the
combination or presence of all three factors at one point in time makes it more likely that
the Afghan insurgents will resort to the use of suicide attacks.

IV. ANALYSIS
In its more than three decades of insurgency and civil war (1978-2010), Afghanistan has
only experienced suicide attacks in the 2000s. From 1978 to 2000, there was no incident
of suicide attacks in Afghanistan.123 However, since the fall of the Taliban regime in
2001, Afghanistan has increasingly experienced suicide attacks. Although accounts vary
123
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on the exact number of suicide attacks carried out each year since 2001, there is consensus
on its dramatic rise since 2006.124 From 2001 to the end of 2005, Afghanistan witnessed a
total of thirty-seven incidents of suicide attacks – one in 2001, one in 2002, two in 2003,
six in 2004, twenty-seven in 2005.125 However, since 2006, the Taliban has employed
over hundred suicide attacks each year up to 2010.126 Figure 1 illustrates the number of
suicide attacks in Afghanistan between 1978 and 2010.

Figure 2.

Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan 1978 – 2010.127

As Figure 2 depicts, the tactic that was totally unfamiliar to Afghans prior to 2001, has
become a common phenomenon in Afghanistan. Taliban are increasingly using suicide
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attacks as a tool in their fight against the US, NATO and Afghan forces. This presents a
puzzle that why, contrary to their predecessors, did the Taliban resort to use of suicide
attack in the 2000s in Afghanistan? To that end, the author argues that, in Afghanistan,
three factors – arms embargo, military pressure, and direct link to an external terrorist
network – combined to foster the use of suicide tactics.
The paper now turns to analyze the impact of each one the three independent
variables on suicide attack in Afghanistan.
A. Arms Embargo
Since 1978, Afghanistan has been experiencing insurgency and civil war. The conflict,
which initially started with small-scale armed reaction to the People Democratic Party of
Afghanistan’s (PDPA) power grab in a bloody coup and ensuing repression in 1978, soon
took the form of national uprising once the Soviets invaded the country a year later in
1979. The fierce Afghan backlash to these un-welcome developments – communist
PDPA’s power grab and Soviet invasion – led to the formation of several Mujahidin
resistance groups in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.128 The resilience of Afghan Mujahidin
against the Soviets attracted Western and Islamic countries’ attention to the Afghan Jihad,
which translated into moral and material support.129
Recalling his memories of the Afghan-Soviet war in a book co-authored with Mark
Adkin, Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence’s (ISI) chief of Afghan Bureau, Brigadier
Mohammad Yousaf, wrote:
As I was about to discover, nothing moves, in peace or war, without money. The
Mujahideen could achieve nothing without financial support. No matter how brilliant my
strategy might be, the implementation depended on the availability of a vast reservoir of
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cash with which to arm, train and move my forces. Almost half of this money originated
from the US taxpayer, with the remainder coming from the Saudi Arabian government or
rich Arab individuals.130

It has been reported that the United States provided “between $4 billion and $5 billion to
the mujahideen between 1980 and 1992,” with Saudi Arabia matching each U.S. dollar
bill in “aid to the mujahideen” around the same period.131 Besides cash to support training
and their other needs, Mujahidin were “well armed with US-supplied surface-to-air
missiles, rockets, mortars, and communication equipment” that won them confrontations
and made “successful ambushes” against Soviets “a daily phenomenon.”132
The abundance of advanced weaponry and other military equipment along with
generous funds explains a lot. It explains why the Afghans did not resort to the use of
suicide attacks in their national uprising against Soviet invasion and their repressive
puppet regime, which cost them an estimated 1.24 million lives,133 4.2 million wounded
and maimed,134 and another 5 million refugees.135 That is, although the tactic was quite
successful in places like Lebanon and Sri Lanka in the 1980s, it was simply not necessary
in Afghanistan.136
After nearly a decade of occupation, the Soviet troops withdrew (1989) and their
puppet regime collapsed into the hands of the Mujahidin in 1992. The Mujahidin,
however, failed to reach consensus on establishing an overarching and inclusive
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government.137 As a result, the country went to a destructive civil war and witnessed the
emergence of a new group called the Taliban in 1994.138
It is believed that Mullah Omar established the Taliban movement in August 1994;
however, their first major military encounter took place some two months later when they
fought Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami forces on 13 October 1994. Soon after, they
marched towards provincial capital of Kandahar province, and took it over from forces
loyal to Hekmatyar on November 5, 1994.139
The Mujahidin government in Kabul, led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani,
initially welcomed the Taliban movement for bringing security and order in Kandahar and
collaborated with them in defending the Ghazni province from Hizb-e-Islami’s assault on
January 25, 1995. With the conquest of the Wardak province from Hekmatyar’s forces on
February 4, 1995, the Taliban became a viable force, controlling one-fifth of the
Afghanistan’s provinces (six out of the thirty) in less than six months of their initial major
military assault against Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami forces in Kandahar.140
In early March of 1995, the Taliban movement secured a deal with Hizb-e-Wahdat,
“an umbrella organization of seven Shiite Movements,” which enabled them to move to
the western parts of the Kabul, previously controlled by Hizb-e-Wahdat.141 This bold
move was threatening to the Rabbani-led Mujahidin government, which immediately
launched a “surprise attack” that pushed back the Taliban and their newly allied Hizb-eWahdat from Kabul, marking the “first defeat” of the Taliban since their uprising.142
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Although not totally abandoning their assault on Kabul, the Taliban concentrated heavily
on Heart province and eventually took it over from President Rabbani’s ally, Ismail Khan,
on September 5, 1995. By October of the same year, once again the Taliban closed
themselves to Kabul and brought it under siege by conquering some of the key peripheral
districts such as Charasyab, Rishkhor, and Khairabad hills.143
Meanwhile on the western front of the country, the Taliban made further gain by
conquering the Ghor province in June 1996, and maintaining the pressure on Kabul with
“heavy missile attacks.”144 Three months later on September 11, 1996, the Taliban
conquered three eastern provinces including the vital city of Jalalabad, capital of
Ningarhar province, which opened new logistical routes from Pakistan to the Taliban.145
These gains put further pressure on the Rabbani government in Kabul, making it
impossible to hold the capital. As a result the Rabbani-led Mujahidin forces withdrew
from Kabul on September 27, 1996, paving the way for the Taliban to take it over without
any resistance.146 The Taliban didn’t stop there and started pushing towards northern
provinces, conquering the Bagram Airport, the key military airfield of the country located
in north of Kabul, in January 1997. In May of the same year, the Taliban made a surprise
short-lived advance in the north of the country by conquering Mazar-e-Sharif. However,
due to their uncompromising policy, their newly won ally, General Malik, turned against
them which cost the Taliban thousands of fighters and loss of the important northern city
of Mazar-e-Sharif.147 In October 1997, the Taliban regrouped to retake Mazar-e-Sharif,
however, their endeavor failed. Eventually the city fell to the Taliban a year later in
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August 1998.148 By 2001, “the Taliban controlled over 90 percent of Afghanistan,”
pushing their opponent – Northern Alliance – into northeast corner of the country.149
The Taliban’s miracle-like swift advances were not possible without extensive
support from Pakistan and Gulf countries. “The Taliban movement … drew on the
military backing of Pakistan and financial support of Saudi Arabia.”150 It has been
reported that Pakistan directly contributed “to the Taliban’s military campaign with its
own forces … [and] at times provided air cover … This support was in addition to, and
quite separate from, the weapons consignments dispatched to Afghanistan as part of
Pakistan’s publicly stated support for the Taliban.”151 According to one account, “As
many as 30 trucks a day crossed the border [from Pakistan] into Afghanistan carrying
artillery shells, tank rounds, and rocket-propelled grenades.”152 Not only that, “the
Pakistani aircraft assisted with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat
operations.”153 Furthermore, “between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000
Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan,” which led one commentator to label it a
“creeping invasion.”154
That is why the Taliban didn’t resort to the use of suicide attack prior to 2001,
simply because they were not under arms embargo and received extensive military
equipment and support from Pakistan. However, after the incident of 9/11 and the
Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden and the subsequent U.S. attack on
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Afghanistan, the Taliban’s fortune and circumstances changed.
The day after 9/11, the U.S. deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, called
General Mahmood Ahmad, chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who was
in the United States visiting the CIA at the time. During the 15 minute “short and … hardhitting conversation,” Armitage conveyed President Bush’s message to Pakistanis:
"You're with us or against us."155 Armitage told General Mahmood that “The president
was speaking out forcefully, not only against those who conducted operations of terror,
but those who supported terrorism or allowed terrorists to exist, and to think carefully.”156
The next day, Richard Armitage summoned the Pakistani ambassador, Dr. Maleeha
Lohdi, along with General Mahmood Ahmad and “laid out seven non-negotiable steps the
Pakistanis must take” in regards to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The list included “ending
… logistical supports to Al-Qaeda,” preventing Taliban’s recruit “from reaching”
Afghanistan, providing “overflight and territorial access rights … to U.S. military forces
and intelligence agencies,” and breaking all ties “with the Taliban government” if they fail
to hand over Osama.157 Within the next 24 hours, the Pakistani “President Musharaf …
agreed to all seven demands.”158
Pakistan wanted to immediately cut off its relationship with the Taliban prior to
launch of the US invasion, but the United States asked Pakistanis to “maintain a hold and
a contact with the Taliban – if only a tenuous one … to resolve the fate of the [western]
hostages” taken by the Taliban.159 However, when the Taliban refused to hand over
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Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistani
President Musharaf dismissed General Mahmood Ahamd, head of ISI and a Taliban
sympathizer, in a show of resolve and signal to the United States about his dedication in
supporting the U.S. campaign and “going in a new direction.”160
The next blow came to the Taliban on September 22, 2001, when the United Arab
Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, two of its three allies, “withdrew their
recognition of the Taliban as the legal government of Afghanistan.”161 Finally, after the
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and disintegration of the Taliban regime, “The UN Security
Council, on January 16, 2002, unanimously established an arms embargo and the freezing
of identifiable assets belonging to bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the remaining Taliban.” 162
Although Pakistan initially cut its official ties with the Taliban and supported the
U.S. led campaign by deploying more than 70,000 troops along the Afghan border and
launching several military operations throughout the years, the Afghan Taliban were
tacitly allowed to shelter in Pakistan and were not made the real targets of these military
operations.163 However, it was not until 2005 that sporadic reports emerged about some
elements within the Pakistani intelligence establishment (ISI) assisting Taliban with
“tactical, operational, and strategic” intelligence to evade the US and NATO led military
operations.164 The Pakistanis started doing this due to the fear of growing Indian influence
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in Afghanistan.165 However, there is no hard evidence to prove that the Taliban receive
state-sponsored large caches of effective weaponry even from the United States’ bitter
rival in the region–the Islamic republic of Iran–since the UN imposed arms embargo.166
Robert M. Gates, then Defense Secretary of the United States, “said during a visit to
Kabul … that there was no evidence as yet that Tehran government officials are involved
in shipping weapons to the country for use against U.S. and NATO forces.”167
Thus the Taliban, which used to be endowed with abundant external resources and
support from Pakistan and Gulf States in their fight against the Mujahidin government
(1994-96) and later against the Northern Alliance (1996-2001), faced the lack of effective
military equipment in the post 9/11 era. In such circumstances, scholars argue that the
need for “leveling the playing field for groups that perceive themselves to be militarily
disadvantaged is a key reason why groups decide to employ this tactic [suicide
attacks].”168 Therefore, “clearly the Taliban have embraced this once-taboo asymmetric
tactic and see suicide bombers—who are referred to as ‘Mullah Omar’s missiles’—as an
equalizer, much as the Stinger ground-to-air missile was in the 1980s.”169
Given that arms embargo was in place since 2002 and suicide attacks started taking
off in 2005, only to reach their climax in 2006, one might wonder what explains the gap
and late showdown of the Taliban with suicide attacks? There are two complementary
explanations for this puzzle. First, as will be explained in the military pressure and
diffusion sections, the Taliban were badly beaten in the initial two months of the US
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invasion of Afghanistan, and were under military pressure since then. This means that it
was hard for the Taliban to immediately regroup and come with possible alternative
solutions to overcome the challenge posed by the arms embargo.
A second more likely and supplementary explanation is the timing of diffusion of
suicide attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan, which will be elaborate in detail in the diffusion
section. The process of diffusion of suicide attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan started
sometime during 2004, but more coordination took place in 2005, making the presence of
all three proposed factors possible in late 2005 to early 2006. The presence of arms
embargo, military pressure and diffusion at one point in time (late 2005 to early 2006)
resulted in the surge of suicide attacks in 2006. This is in line with the argument of this
paper that suicide attacks are more likely when all three factors are present at one point in
time.
B. Military Pressure
There is no systematic data about the number of military operations conducted by the
Soviets and the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan’s (PDPA) forces against the
Mujahidin in the 1980s. However, what is evident is the overall number of the Soviet
troops and the PDPA’s forces fighting the Mujahidin. In 1978, the number of PDPA’s
military personnel was estimated to be 90,000.170 This number, however, decreased to
35,000 troops over the next four years until 1981.171 The decrease in the number of
Kabul’s communist government forces made the Soviets compensate with their own
troops by increasing their military forces in Afghanistan from 85,000 in 1981 to 130,000
in 1985.172

170

Shay, Shaul, 2002, The Endless Jihad, p. 40.
Ibid., p. 40.
172
Ibid., p. 40.
171

41
Meanwhile by 1985, the number of the Afghan Mujahidin fighting the Soviets and
their puppet regime were reported to be some 250,000.173 Although in the first half of the
1980s, “the Soviets had advantage in firepower,” this would soon change once the United
States start supplying Stinger missiles.174 Even in the first half of the 1980s, the Soviets
were constrained to major cities, whereas the Afghan Mujahidin “were able to take
control of most of the countryside.”175 The sheer number of the Afghan Mujahidin and the
sixty percent decrease in the number of PDPA’s armed forces vividly illustrates Afghans’
bitterness towards the Soviet invaders and their puppet communist regime in Kabul, and
their willingness to fight and expel the Soviets and to topple the PDPA.
The evidence presented shows that while there was battlefield power asymmetry in
the initial years of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, the Mujahidin access to outside
weaponry supplies and their overwhelmingly large number changed battlefield dynamics
into their favor in the second half of the 1980s. The access to weaponry and absence of
severe power asymmetry mean that the Mujahidin were not challenged to the extent to
look for alternative solutions. Meanwhile, the mere absence of arms embargo during the
1980s supports the author’s proposition that the likelihood of suicide attacks is high when
all three factors are present at one point in time. Thus the absence of arms embargo in the
1980s mean that it was less likely for the Mujahidin to resort to the use of suicide attacks.
However, for the decade of the 1990s, there is literally no evidence about the
number of attacks between various warring Mujahidin parties and the number of their
fighters, and similarly there is little evidence about skirmishes between the Taliban and
the Mujahidin and the number of forces involved. Given the Taliban’s swift rise to power
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in two years from rebellion to ruling (1994-1996), and their access to extensive military
equipment and support from Pakistan and fund from Saudi, discussed in the previous
sections, it is evident that the Taliban did not face battlefield obstacles and power
asymmetry or military pressure from their adversary to resort to the use of suicide attacks.
Again this is in line with the author’s main argument that the presence of all three
independent variables at one point in time makes it highly likely for suicide attacks to
occur.
That being said, there is some systematic qualitative and quantitative data for the
2000s, albeit limited, that would help in operationalizing the military pressure variable in
the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan. As explained earlier, for operationalizing
military pressure in the 2000s, I will be looking at the number of Afghan and foreign
troops between 2002 and 2009. An increase in their number would translate into
battlefield disadvantage and pressure to the Taliban.
Meanwhile, I look at the number of military operations launched by the US and
NATO led coalition troops against the Taliban, which means the more the number of
troops involved and the lengthier the operations, the more pressure they should exert on
the Taliban by killing or capturing them and denying them safe havens. Along the same
line, the more casualties caused to the insurgents from the military operations or aerial
bombing should mean that the insurgents are under pressure. And lastly expansion of
troops and holding the ground by establishing bases literally mean denial of safe havens to
the Taliban, which mean they are under military pressure. Once again it should be
reminded that our data have limitations and everything is not in the numbers.
The number of foreign troops and Afghan secrurity forces steadily increased over
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the years between 2002 and 2009. Figure 3, 4, 5, illustrates the number of Afghan
National Army (ANA), U.S. troops, and NATO-led International Security Assistance
Forces (ISAF) between 2002 and 2009 respectively.

Figure 3. Number of Afghan National Army 2003 – 2009.176
Note: Figure 3 does not include approximately 30 to 60 thousand militias loyal to
warlords who were involved in action against the Taliban.177 Also excluded here is the
number of Afghan National Police, which experienced the similar rate of growth and were
mostly involved in action against the insurgents.178

Figure 4. Number of US Forces in Afghanistan 2002 – 2009.179
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Figure 5. Number of Other Foreign Troops, Excluding US Forces 2002 – 2009.180
The steady increase in the number of the Afghan National Army (Feagure 3), U.S. troops
(Figure 4), and NATO led ISAF forces (Figure 5) corresponds to the author’s proposition
that increase in the number of troops over the years should exert pressure on the
insrurgents by killing, capturing, and denying them safe havens.
That being said, the paper turns to detailed discussion of these military operations
that were conducted between 2002 and 2007– the years for which some systematic data
was available. I would like to mention that due to data limitation, it was not possible to
present the number of troops involved in each military operation, duration of each of these
operations, or casualties caused to the insurgents in a table. Therefore, following part of
this section is a blend of qualitative and quantitative analysis to show the impact of these
military operations on restricting the Taliban’s conventional fighting capabilities, which
further exacerbated battlefied power asymmetry and made the Taliban to look for
alternative tactics (e.g., suicide attaks).
Another crucial point before getting into detailed discsussion of military
operations between 2002 and 2007, is that after killing some ten to thirty thoudand
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Taliban fighters and their affiliates in the initial two months of invasion (Oct 07 - Dec 07,
2001),181 the U.S. and NATO led international troops mainly started the following
military operations with the intent of wiping out the remnants of the Taliban and AlQaeda altogether. Since the total number of the Taliban forces during the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan was approximated to be thirty to fifty thousands,182 this means that the
Taliban were already badly beaten before these military operations.
1. Military Operations (2002 - 2007)

After total demise of the Taliban regime on December 9, 2001,183 Operation Anaconda
was the first one of the four major military operations launched in 2002 in Afghanistan. In
March 2002, a total of two thousand seven hundred troops from the U.S. (1000), NATO
allies (200), and the Afghan National Army (1500) came together to wipe out the
remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda that were believed to be hiding in the Shah-i-Khot
Valley of the Paktia province in eastern Afghanistan. The insurgents, numbering roughly
2,000, sustained a heavy loss (400 dead) from 3,500 bombs dropped on their strongholds
during the US-led offensive.184 However, due to coalition troops’ heavy reliance on
intensive aerial bombardments and their poor ground coordination, the rest of the
insurgents managed to evade them and submerge into the Pakistani tribal areas.185
Operation Mountain Lion (June 2002) followed Operation Anaconda in the
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southeastern mountains of Afghanistan. The objective of the operation was to deny safehavens to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Meanwhile in early to mid 2002, British troops
conducted Operation Jacana – a series of offensives – to dismantle the Taliban’s bases and
supplies in the southeastern mountains of Afghanistan.186 As a result, larges cache of the
Taliban’s weaponry and their bases, encompassing cluster of caves, were captured and
destroyed by the British-led offensive.187 In late August 2002, Southeastern Afghanistan
witnessed Operation Mountain Sweep. During the operation, the coalition troops
unearthed five weaponry stockpiles, along with Taliban documents.188 These operations
were so intense that even children as young as 13 years old were arrested and sent to
Guantanamo Bay.189
Meanwhile, Afghanistan witnessed seven large military operations during 2003. In
January, the coalition launched Operation Mongoose. Besides seizing and destroying a
large stockpile of armaments, the coalition troops killed twenty-two and captured thirteen
insurgents during the operation.190 Right after Operation Mongoose, the US-led coalition
troops launched Operation Valiant Strike in eastern Afghanistan on 20 March 2003. The
operation, which coincided with the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, was launched based
on the intelligence received from Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s interrogation. Six hundred
troops, including conventional and Special Forces units, were deployed in action that
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resulted in confiscation of “more than 170 rocket-propelled grenades, as well as mines
and mortar rounds, the third such weapons cache discovered in the area … [along with]
heavy machine-guns, rocket-propelled grenades, 82mm mortar rounds, and 107mm
rockets.”191
The day Operation Valiant Strike ended, US troops launched Operation Desert
Lion in northeastern Afghanistan’s Kohi-Safi Mountains. During the operation, the troops
found large caches of weaponry. In June of 2003 as part of new military operation called
Operation Dragon Fury, a brigade-sized US and Italian forces launched an offensive
which resulted in small-scale confrontation with the Taliban and twenty-one arrests. 192
Over the next month (July 23, 2003), U.S. led coalition troops launched Operation
Warrior Seep "to kill, capture and deny sanctuary to anti-coalition fighters and to disrupt
anti-coalition activity" in the southern Afghanistan’s villages and mountains.193 Besides
confiscating six stockpiles of the Taliban’s weaponry,194 the US-led offensive of more
than 3,000 troops, killed and arrested ‘dozens’ of the Taliban in the action.195
Late 2003 witnessed two more military operations. Operation Mountain Viper
(September 2003) was launched in Zabul province to clear pockets of the Taliban and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s forces from the area. Coalition troops killed some seventy to one
hundred insurgent fighters during the operation.196 The year 2003 ended with Operation
Avalanche (December 2003). Operation Avalanche began in the eastern and southern part
191
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of the country.197 The operation “uncovered caches of rifles, pistols, rocket-propelled
grenade launchers, howitzers, plus rockets, artillery shells, land mines, and other
ammunition.”198 During the offensive, more than one hundred insurgents were arrested
and ten more were killed in the action.199
The next year, 2004, witnessed six large military operations. The coalition troops
started their new year with Operation Mountain Blizzard (Jan 2004). During the two
months long operation, coalition troops “conducted 1,731 patrols and 143 raids and
cordon-and-search operations” that resulted in discovery of large stockpiles of weaponry
such as “3,648 rockets, 3,202 mortar rounds, 2,944 rocket- propelled grenades, 3,000 rifle
rounds, 2,232 mines and tens of thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition.”200
Meanwhile, twenty-two anti-coalition fighters were killed during the operation and a
bunch of others were arrested.201 Right after Operation Mountain Blizzard, the US-led
coalition deployed more than 13,000 strong forces as part of Operation Mountain Storm
“in the south, southeast, and eastern” regions of the country to ‘kill or capture’ and
‘search-and-destroy’ the insurgents and their infrastructures.202
Meanwhile, June 2004 witnessed Operation Thunder Road. “The 14-day operation
netted an impressive quantity of arms, ammunition, and ordnance … [and] those enemy
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fighters who rose up to resist the Marines were quickly dealt with.”203 On July 2004, the
U.S.-led coalition troops launched Operation Lightening Resolve. This time, besides
hunting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the operation also meant to provide security for
Afghanistan’s election process.204 Major Robert Ault disclosed information about the
changing nature of the insurgency and the coalition’s new ‘tactics’ in engaging them.
According to Ault, insurgents “stood and fought, but sustained losses probably in the
hundreds … They learned every time they engage us, they lose… [Thus] we’re seeing the
enemy transition into smaller formations and pick its fights more carefully.”205
The year ended with two new military operations that were launched in December
(2004) and continued to early 2005. Operation Thunder Freedom and Operation Lightning
Freedom were jointly launched to hit the insurgents hard during their weakness – winter
season. An estimated 18,000 foreign troops participated in the winter offensive.206
Meanwhile, another important objective of these operations was to force the insurgents to
accept amnesty offered by the newly elected Afghan government and coalition troops. 207
In addition to Operation Thunder Freedom and Operation Lightning Freedom that
started in December 2004 and continued to early 2005, coalition troops along with their
Afghan counterparts launched six large military operations during 2005. Operation Spurs
(Jan - Feb),208 Operation Mavericks (Mar-Apr),209 and Operation Celtics (May),210 were
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three back-to-back operations in early 2005 that resulted in disclosing several stockpiles
of weaponry and explosives, and arrest of suspected militants.
However, it should be noted that most of the large caches of weaponry found
during military operations throughout the years are believed to be those left behind by the
Soviet Army and later by the Taliban regime.211
The rest of 2005 witnessed three more military operations. In June 2005, the
coalition troops launched Operation Red Wings to hunt down insurgents and disrupt their
activities in the Kunar province. At least 465 insurgents were killed in the ongoing
battle.212 In August 2005, the coalition launched Operation Whalers to capitalize on the
achievements of Operation Red Wings in Kunar. Coalition troops along with their Afghan
counterparts stormed the valleys and mountains of the Kunar province, with their fighter
planes searching from the sky. The two operations eventually attained their main objective
that was to terminate Ahmad Shah, a notorious militant commander with a “small army of
barbarous fighters.”213 The year ended with Operation Pil (Elephant). Damages inflicted
to the enemy during Operation Pil were not made public.214 In several sporadic
engagements during 2005, an estimated 235 insurgents were killed by coalition
warplanes.215
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Unable to face coalition and Afghan troops mainly due to losses suffered during
military operation and aerial bombardments, the Taliban shifted tactics in 2005.
According to Afghan and U.S. military commanders, “to avoid additional casualties …
insurgents have recently begun ambushing soldiers with the roadside improvised
explosives that have proven successful in Iraq.”216 Meanwhile, the insurgents also started
employing suicide attacks against the Afghan government targets and foreign troops in
2005.217
During 2006, coalition and Afghan forces conducted six large-scale military
operations. Operation Mountain Lion was the first to be launched in Kunar province on
March 25, 2006. The operation, which included some 2,500 coalition and Afghan troops,
conducted “over 650 patrols.”218 Besides killing 80 Taliban fighters, the coalition and
Afghan troops discovered 12 weaponry caches during the operation.219 Operation
Mountain Thrust followed Operation Mountain Lion in May. Dubbed to be as one of the
largest since the fall of the Taliban regime, Operation Mountain Thrust was a big blow to
the Taliban who lost 1,100 fighters on the battlefield and another 400 as captives.220
In mid-July 2006, Canadian and Afghan forces with some support from U.S.,
British and Dutch troops, launched an offensive called Operation Zahara (Battle of
Panjwaii I) to clear the Taliban from Panjwaii. The operation cleared the Taliban’s
presence from the area, but, shortly after coalition and Afghan troops withdrew from
Panjwaii, reports of the Taliban activity in the area started circulating. Canadian and
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Afghan forces with support of other allies launched Operation Medusa (Battle of Panjwaii
II) to eradicate the insurgents from the area. During their two-week long operation around
Kandahar city, coalition and Afghan forces killed “512 Taliban fighters” on the ground
and arrested “another 136” of them.221
On September 16, 2006, coalition troops along with their Afghan counterparts
launched Operation Mountain Fury in eastern Afghanistan.222 Although the Taliban had
started employing suicide attacks in skirmishes with the coalition and Afghan troops a
year ago, the tactic was heavily used in their counter-offensive during Operation
Mountain Fury. The Taliban employed some 23 suicide bombers in their retaliatory
assaults during Operation Mountain Fury.223 The four month long operation resulted in
deaths of more than 1,100 Taliban and arrest of 179 of them.224 Mullah Akhtar
Mohammad Osmani, a prominent figure in the Taliban movement, was among those
killed during the operation on December 19, 2006.225
In addition to Operation Mountain Fury, coalition and Afghan troops also
launched Operation Falcon Summit in the southern Afghanistan in December 2006. The
operation successfully removed the Taliban from areas around Kandahar city.226
Meanwhile during 2006, the U.S. and NATO-led foreign troops heavily relied on aerial
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bombardments, numbering “more than 2,000 air strikes,” which increased civilian
casualties and Afghans’ resentment to such operations.227
The year 2007 started with a British offensive, called Operation Volcano (JanFeb), to secure areas around the Kajaki dam in the southern Afghanistan’s Helmand
Province.228 It was the first of the seven large-scale military operations to be conducted in
2007 in Afghanistan. Soon after it successfully ended, the NATO-led troops mounted a
much larger and ambitious offensive with 6,500 troops – Operation Achilles – to clear the
insurgents from the whole province – Helmand.229 The biggest achievement of the
operation for coalition and Afghan troops was the assassination of Mullah Dadullah – a
fierce anti-coalition campaigner and advocate of suicide attacks.230 Mullah Dadullah was
also the most prominent commander to be killed in the six-year long campaign against the
Taliban’s insurgency. During the three months long campaign (March 6 to May 30 2007),
the coalition and Afghan troops killed approximately 700 to 1,000 Taliban fighters.231
Around the same time two other military operations – Operation Silver and Operation
Silicon – were conducted as part of an effort “to keep up pressure on the Taliban” in the
southern Afghanistan.232
The day Operation Achilles ended (May 30, 2007), NATO led ISAF forces
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launched Operation Pickaxe-Handle in Helmand province. The outcome of the operation
is disputed because soon after their withdrawal, Taliban activities were reported in areas
surrounding Kajaki dam.233 To build on their disputed “momentum and strategic success
of” Operation Pickaxe-Handle, the British-led NATO troops in the south of the country
launched Operation Ghartse Gar.234 The operation was a success in clearing the Taliban
stronghold from Sangin district of the Helmand province. During the operation, unknown
numbers of the “Taliban were destroyed, or managed to escape from the area.”235 The
year ended with Operation Rock Avalanche in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province,
which killed some twenty insurgents.236
According to one account, from 2002 to 2009, “overall insurgent losses have been
estimated to be between 25,000 and 30,000, with 20,000 captured.”237 This level of
casualty in itself is a good indicator of pressure on the Taliban.
Meanwhile, besides the large-scale military operations launched to search and
destroy the insurgents and their hideouts, U.S. and coalition Special Forces separately
tasked with ‘capturing or killing’ leaders of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were also operating
in Afghanistan during these years.238 Due to the top-secret nature of Special Forces
operations, the exact number of their raids per year is unknown. However, a recent leak in
2010 put the number of raids around ‘200 a month,’ which means special forces
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conducted 24,000 night raid operations in 2010 with 50 to 60 percent success in capturing
or killing their targets.239 The disclosed figures further show that ‘368 insurgents leaders’
have been arrested or killed by special forces during the three months of these
operations.240
The detailed analysis of military operations supports the author’s proposition that
states’ exercise of force through its security forces hinders insurgents’ capabilities and
denies them access to safe havens, which subsequently makes insurgents resort to
alternative method or tactics to compensate for their battlefield disadvantages.
A final note on military pressure variable is the shift in the foreign troops’ earlier
policy of ‘kill or capture’ or ‘search and destroy’ and leave the area to one of establishing
bases and holding the grounds after clearing them from insurgents. This, I argued, exerts
pressure on the insurgents by denying them access to their safe havens. Figure 6 illustrates
the expansion the NATO led ISAF forces from Kabul to rest of the country between 2004
and 2006.
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Figure 6. NATO-led ISAF Forces Expansion 2004 – 2006.241
As illustrated by arrows in Figure 6, the first phase of NATO led ISAF troops’ expansion
started from Kabul to the North of the country in a bid to support the Afghan government
in 2004. The next year (2005) witnessed the ISAF expanding its domain of operations and
bases to the Western region of the country. Since the northern and western regions of
Afghanistan were not the hubs of the insurgents, ISAF expansion did not deny them
access to their safe havens, and we should not expect a backlash. However, in early 2006
the NATO led ISAF troops announced to move to the Afghanistan’s southern and eastern
regions, which were the Taliban’s strongholds. ISAF’s move to the insurgents’ hotspots
meant to deny the Taliban access to their sanctuaries, which meant exerting military
pressure on the Taliban. Therefore, the year 2006 witnessed a five-fold increase in number
of suicide attacks from 27 in 2005 to a 139 suicide attacks.
However, two points should be noted: first, there were some U.S. troops stationed in
the South and East of Afghanistan; and second, by the end of 2005 diffusion of suicide
241
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attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan, had already taken place through direct connections to
the Iraqi insurgents. Thus the end of 2005 to early 2006 in Afghanistan was the period
when the three factors were present at one point in time, which should explain the sudden
rise of suicide attacks in Afghanistan. The paper now turns to detailed discussion of
diffusion.
C. Diffusion
There are no systematic data to prove the link between the Afghan Mujahidin and
Hezbollah of Lebanon to explore diffusion of suicide attacks. However, there were Arab
fighters fighting against the Soviets alongside the Afghan Mujahidin in the second half of
the 1980s.242 It was during this time when the Saudi-born Osama bin Laden first traveled
to the region and opened a guesthouse for the Arab fighters in 1988 in Pakistan, which
later become known as Al-Qaeda.243 After the Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Osama and other Arab fighters returned to their home countries.244 It was not until the mid
1990s that Osama would reappear in Afghanistan once again.
In 1996, under the U.S. and British led international community pressure, the
Sudanese government deported Osama bin Laden.245 Unable and uninterested to go back
to Saudi,246 Osama headed towards Afghanistan where he had spent years during the
Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, and where a radical group was taking hold and
becoming the main player – the Taliban.247 The Taliban leadership welcomed their
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wealthy guest who needed “security and sanctuary,” but could provide “much needed
financial resources,” training to the Taliban fighters, and a “well trained 055 Brigade (a
group of 500 to 1000 Arab fighters) for key battles” against the Northern Alliance.248
It was here in Afghanistan that Osama reassessed his organization’s (Al-Qaeda)
operational strategy. As a result of reassessment and the ensuing strategic shift in the
organizations’ modus operandi; Al Qaeda decided to target the west, especially the United
States rather than fighting their so-called Arab puppet regimes.249 As such, Al-Qaeda
under Osama bin Laden’s direct supervision, “planned various operations, including
September 11” against the United States.250 The total number of attacks orchestrated by
Al-Qaeda against the U.S. and its allies between 1996 and 2003 is estimated to be twentyone suicide bombings, with 9/11 marking the deadliest in the history of this lethal
tactic.251
As evidence shows, while the Taliban benefited from the presence of al-Qaeda and
its resources in their war against Northern Alliance, they did not endorse Al-Qaeda’s new
tactic at the time (prior to 9/11). This I argue is purely due to resource endowment and
battlefield dynamics that were in favor of the Taliban at the time; a scenario that rapidly
shifted after 9/11.
Just within the first two months (Oct 07 - Dec 07, 2001) of Operation Enduring
Freedom – the United States retaliation to 9/11 incident that mainly aimed at hunting
down Al-Qaeda leader and overthrowing the Taliban regime – the U.S. and its allied
forces killed some ten to thirty thousand of the Taliban and their al-Qaeda affiliates,252
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and destroyed their infrastructure.253 According to Shaul Shay (2002), “The Taliban forces
… usually did not number more than thirty thousand soldiers, but in preparation for
important battles recruitment was increased … [to] reach fifty thousand soldiers.”254 This
immediate blow to their ranks and capacities along with loss of external resources and
arms embargo put the Taliban in the difficult position. The subsequent military operations
exerted further pressure on the Taliban and their supplies. Brigadier Roger Lane, senior
commander of the British commandos, describes the impacts of military operations on
insurgents’ supplies as follows:
History has taught us that killing or capturing individual members of a terrorist group,
whilst a bonus where it can be achieved, is not always the most effective means to deliver
a strategic blow to that group's operational capability… Disrupting their planning,
destroying their logistic supplies and denying them a safe haven is at least as important,
often more so.255

Adding to that, Maj. Lewis Matson, Central Command spokesperson, said "There's no
question that they've [Taliban] been denied sanctuary… That's really the key element
here. They don't have the ability to assemble in mass.... It's fire an RPG (rocket-propelled
grenade) and run."256
Looking at these unwelcome developments and shifting battlefield dynamics in
favor of the adversary, Al-Qaeda proposed the use of suicide attacks. Ayman al-Zawahiri,
al-Qaeda’s second in command, argued in favor of suicide attacks as “the most successful
way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the Mujahedin in
terms of casualties.”257 Initially, Mullah Omar was reluctant, but the proposal had a great
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appeal to his field commanders, especially Mullah Dadullah.258 “By 2003, the Taliban
field commanders were clearly interested in any strategy or tactic that allowed them to
undermine” the U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan.259 In early 2003 in an interview with
BBC, Mullah Dadullah said: "The ground became hot for the Russians here, and so … the
ground will also become hot for the Americans."260
The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent success of the Iraqi suicide attack
campaign in late 2003 and early 2004 seemed to have convinced the Taliban leadership
about the effectiveness of the new tactic against “seemingly invincible” enemy – the
United Sates.261 As early as “2004, several camps were established just across the border”
in Pakistani tribal areas to train the Taliban fighters the new skill set transferred from
Iraq.262 According to some experts, “there is evidence of cooperation between insurgents
in Iraq and Afghanistan… small number of Pakistani and Afghan militants received
military training in Iraq; Iraqi fighters met with Afghan and Pakistani extremists in
Pakistan,” which translated into the use of “homemade bombs, suicide attacks, and other
tactics honed in Iraq” to the Afghan battlefield.263 Definitely, Al-Qaeda was the main hub
for connecting Afghan/Pakistani insurgents to Iraqi militants.264 Mohammad Daud,
Hamza Sangari, and Mullah Haq Yar were among those Taliban fighters “dispatched to
Iraq by Mullah Omar to learn the Iraqi insurgents’ tactics.”265
Meanwhile, Iraqi Jihadi videos dubbed in the Pashtu language started circulating in
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Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas (FATA) as early as summer of 2004. These
so-called ‘kill DVDs’ filled with videos of targeted suicide bombings against the
Americans in Iraq were encouraging and promising for the Taliban operatives who had
experienced their own devastation by the American aerial bombings.266 Similarly there are
reports of “three-man delegation … sent by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi… [to] met Osama bin
Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and Mullah Omar…. The delegation brought audio and video
material justifying suicide attacks.”267
However, for the Taliban it was not enough. They needed something not only to
encourage and inspire, but also to justify the previously unknown and forbidden act of
suicide among the locals. Therefore, the Taliban were interested in videos from the
Afghan battlefield with local texture. To address the Taliban’s need, Abu Yahya al Libi,
an Al-Qaeda operative in the region, started making Iraqi-modeled Afghan videos. Some
of the main videos were “Holocaust for the Americans in Afghanistan, Pyre for the
Americans in Afghanistan, and The Wind of Paradise.”268
In 2005, Mullah Dadullah started a campaign to “win hearts and minds in order to
develop an organized strategy of suicide attacks for the 2006 offensive. He showed audio
and video material from the Iraqi resistance which explained that suicide attacks were
permitted and demonstrated how the Iraqis used them as their most effective weapon.”269
Ahmad Rashid argues that “Many of the initial suicide bombers were Pakistani and
Afghan orphans or mentally unstable teenagers recruited from asylums, orphanages, and
Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Taliban leaders correctly predicted that their sacrifice
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would create a wave of more capable and dedicated recruits.”270 As a result of Iraqi videos
justifying suicide attacks and initially employing ‘mentally unstable teenagers’ and
videotaping them “reading their wills before blowing themselves up,”271 Mullah Dadullah
“managed to convince a first group of 450 recruits” for his 2006 offensive.272
A UNAMA report on suicide attacks in Afghanistan argues that “The Taliban are
likely to have influence in directing ideological worldviews promulgated at pro-Taliban
madrassas, and they are likely to have sway over specific teachers and administrators to
encourage children and young adults to consider volunteering” for suicide attacks.273 In
one his interviews about the Taliban’s coordination and cooperation with the Iraqi
insurgents, Mullah Dadullah provided the following answers:
Interviewer: Do you coordinate with them [Iraqi insurgents] in military operations in
Afghanistan?
Mullah Dadullah: Yes, when we need them, we ask for their help. For example, the
bombings we carry out — we learned it from them... We learn other types of operations
from them as well. We have “give and take” relations with the mujahideen of Iraq. We
cooperate and help each other.
Interviewer: Do you send people for training? For example, do they come here for
training, or do you maintain contact through the Internet?
Mullah Dadullah: We have training centers here in Afghanistan, and, as you know, they
have their own centers there. If we discover anything new, they come here to learn it, and
if they discover anything new, our friends go to learn it from them.274

This is how suicide attacks diffused from Iraq to Afghanistan. Brian Williams in his piece,
describes in detail the process of diffusion from Iraq to Afghanistan, which he labels the
“Iraq Effect.”275 To that end, I agree but also emphasize the importance of the other two
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factors – arms embargo and military pressure – which together with diffusion at one point
in time make it more likely that insurgents will resort to the use of suicide attacks.
According to experts:
… al Qaeda and the Taliban concluded that suicide bombing was more effective than other
tactics in killing Afghan and coalition forces… Data show that when insurgents fight U.S.
and coalition forces directly in Afghanistan, there is only a 5 percent probability of
inflicting casualties. With suicide attacks, the chance of killing people and instilling fear
276
increased several fold.

Thus it seems that the presence of direct links to an external terrorist network in
combination with arms embargo and military pressure made the Taliban resort to the use
of suicide attacks in the 2000s in Afghanistan.

V.

CONCLUSION

Certainly no one has read the mind of Mullah Omar, the elusive leader of the Taliban
movement, to postulate with 100 percent certainty what made him resort to the use of
suicide attacks. This, however, should not discourage us from theorizing in search of
objective reality. With such a spirit, the author initiated this paper to find out why,
contrary to their predecessors, did the Taliban resort to the use of suicide attacks in the
2000s in Afghanistan? Although some noble direct and indirect (UNAMA Report 2007;
Willams fieldwork 2008; Jones 2009) attempts have been made to understand and explain
this cumbersome puzzle, none of the pieces is systematic and rigorous. Therefore, this
paper is the first systematic assessment of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, and a countryspecific contribution to existing literature on suicide bombings.
By drawing from diffusion and innovation literature, the author argued the presence
of arms embargo, military pressure, and diffusion at one point in time made the Taliban
resort to the use of suicide attacks. The proposition offered here also explains the dramatic
276
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rise in suicide attacks between 2005 and 2006. Although arms embargo was in effect since
2002, and the Taliban were increasingly under military pressure, diffusion was not present
until late 2004 to mid 2005. Once the diffusion took effect in mid to late 2005, the
presence of all three factors at one point in time resulted in a dramatic increase of suicide
attacks in 2006 in Afghanistan. This is in line with the general argument of this paper that
suicide attacks are more likely when all three factors are present at one point in time.
However, it should be noted that data limitation was a big challenge in
systematically assessing the impact of the three independent variables across time from
1978 to 2010. There are some time periods that there are no data, and other times where
there are data available. Therefore, future researchers with access to quantitative data on
the missing years can better assess the impacts of the three independent variables on the
occurrence of suicide attacks throughout the period (1978-2010) in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, since this paper offers a new framework for explaining suicide attacks in the
context of Afghanistan, future research can employ this framework in other case specific
contexts or cross-country cases to see whether or not it explains the puzzle.
Since the findings of this paper suggest that the deadly combination of arms
embargo, military pressure and diffusion makes it more likely that suicide attacks will
occur, the author, in line with Michael Horowitz and Philip Potter (2013),277 suggest that
policy circles should focus their attention to the linkages between the insurgent groups
rather than treating them as isolated. Therefore, the best time to stop the manifestation of
suicide attacks is to target insurgent groups links to external terrorist network prior to the
transfer of suicide attacks’ know-how. Once the insurgents acquire the knowledge, the
277
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more they are pressured through arms embargo and/or military pressure, the more likely
the insurgents would unfortunately employ suicide attacks to overcome the battlefield
power asymmetry.
While it seems impossible to eradicate this phenomenon altogether, especially
when the three factors— arms embargo, military pressure and diffusion—are present,
attempts should be made to at least avoid the mistakes that increase the pool of volunteers
for the insurgent groups. For the time being, that is the only thing I suppose we can do.
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